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Abstract
We study collusion in a second price auction with two bidders in a dy-
namic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion pro-
posal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent.
We show there always exists a robust equilibrium in which the collusion suc-
cess probability is one. In the equilibrium, the interim expected payoff of
the collusion initiator Pareto dominates the counterpart in any robust equi-
libria of the single-option model (Eso¨ and Schummer (2004)) and any other
separating equilibria in our model.
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1 Introduction
Under standard assumptions auctions are a simple yet effective economic insti-
tution that allows the owner of a scarce resource to extract economic rents from
buyers. Collusion among bidders, on the other hand, can ruin the rents and hence
should be one of the top issues that are always kept in the minds of the auction
designers with a revenue-maximizing objective. In the literature, collusion in auc-
tions are typically modelled as a static game in which bidders already agree to form
a cartel and the mission of the cartel is to select a representative bidder (to win the
object at a low price in the auction) and decide the side-payments (e.g., Graham
and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), Marshall and Marx (2007), and
McAfee and McMillan (1992)). Although collusion can be guaranteed through
a revelation game, the working of such a cartel typically requires the aid of an
incentiveless third party. Furthermore, the static model misses a realistic and im-
portant scenario when a particular bidder has strong bargaining power and thus is
interested in monetizing it through some bargaining process with other bidders.
In a pioneering work, Eso¨ and Schummer (2004) (hereafter, ES) consider a dy-
namic model of bidder collusion in a second price auction before which a bidder
has the opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of bribe in exchange for the
opponent’s absence from the auction (or bidding zero). Since their work, alter-
native models in the same vein have been proposed. For example, Rachmilevitch
(2013) considers the same bargaining protocol in first price auctions and Rachmile-
vitch (2015) assumes equal bargaining power between the bidders who can make
an offer sequentially. Troyan (2017) extends ES’s model to interdependent values
and affiliated signals.
The papers cited above share a common feature, i.e., the collusion proposal
specifies a positive transfer from the initiator to the opponent. However, it is natural
that if offering a bribe to the opponent is feasible then requesting a bribe from the
opponent should also be available in the initiator’s toolbox.
The collusion initiator may consider a combination of both a bribe and a re-
quest for the following two reasons. First, with one more option available for the
opponent to choose to accept, it seems to improve the probability of successful
collusion (if the initiator cares about it), as compared to the single-option scheme.
Second, and most importantly, a double-option scheme seems to be more lucrative
for the initiator, provided it can be successfully implemented.
With the additional option, a multi-dimensional signaling game emerges and
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the problem of adverse selection may be more severe, so that the existence and ro-
bustness of equilibria are at stake. To examine the implementability, we consider a
second price auction with two bidders, as in ES. Specifically, we assume that a bid-
der has an opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, consisting
of both a bribe and a request, to the opponent before a second price auction starts.
The opponent can accept at most one option in the proposal, in which case both
bidders follow the proposal and bid cooperatively in the auction. If the opponent
rejects the proposal, then both bidders compete non-cooperatively in the auction.
The solution concept we use is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter,
equilibrium). If an equilibrium survives the D1 criterion (Cho and Sobel (1990)),
the same standard refinement used in ES, it is said to be robust.1 To illustrate our
main points, we focus on separating equilibria. Although there may exist a multi-
plicity of separating equilibria, we show that there always exists a robust separating
equilibrium in which the initiator’s request is equal to his valuation. In the equilib-
rium, the opponent always accepts the collusion proposal (accepting one of the two
options), i.e., for each type of the initiator, the probability of a successful collusion
is one. The significance of this result is threefold. First, a separating equilibrium
does not always exist in ES’s model. Secondly, in ES, the initiator typically can not
be guaranteed a successful collusion because the best response of the opponent is to
accept the bribe if her type is low and reject it otherwise. Hence, in our model, such
a double-option scheme generally improves the probability of successful collusion
upon the single-option one. Thirdly, perhaps more importantly, the result shows
that second price auctions in this dynamic environment are as vulnerable as in the
static model, even though now the bidders do not agree on collusion beforehand
and both acts strategically.2
It is interesting to compare the expected payoff of the initiator in our model
with the counterpart in ES. On one hand, it seems that the additional option itself
alone represents an additional channel through which the initiator can extract more
surplus from the opponent. On the other hand, the additional option tends to in-
tensify the adverse selection problem. In particular, an interesting feature of the
separating equilibrium is that the bribe may exceed the initiator’s valuation, which
1Milgrom and Roberts (1986) apply the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)), which is
weaker than the D1 criterion, for their multidimensional signaling model of price and advertising
expenditure decisions by a firm trying to convey information about its product quality to consumers.
2In Rachmilevitch (2015), under some conditions, there exists an efficient equilibrium in which a
successful collusion is also guaranteed. However, in that model the two bidders engage in two rounds
of alternating offers of bribes and thus neither of them has full bargaining power.
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suggests it can be very costly for the initiator to signal his strength. We show that in
the identified separating equilibrium the double-option scheme generally improves
profitability for each type of the initiator upon ES on the basis of the D1 crite-
rion. Thus in the sense of Pareto dominance, the initiator has strong incentive to
implement the double-option scheme.
As mentioned above, in our model there may exist a multiplicity of separating
equilibria. Hence, it is natural to ask if there exist any separating equilibria in which
(at least) for some types of the initiator the expected payoff can be even higher. It
turns out that the expected payoff of the initiator in the identified equilibrium Pareto
dominates the counterpart in any other separating equilibrium in our model.
For convenience of exposition, our main results are derived with the absence of
a reserve price in the auction. As explained in section 5.1, a positive reserve price
essentially does not change the results.
Although in this paper we focus on second price auctions, we also notice that
even if the auction format is changed to a first price auction, a separating equilib-
rium always exists as well. This is in sharp contrast with the results in Rachmile-
vitch (2013) which considers a bribing model as ES but with a first price auction.
We explain the observation in section 5.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief review of related literature
is given for the rest of this section. In section 2 we describe the model. In section
3 we characterize the separating equilibrium and show its robustness. In section 4
we compare the payoff of the initiator in our model to the counterpart in any robust
equilibria in ES and other separating equilibria in our model. In section 5 we give
a brief discussion of the role of a reserve price and a switch to a first price auction.
Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to the growing literature of collusion in auctions. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the traditional approach is to consider a static game
before which some bidders have already agreed on participation of collusion. On
the other hand, ES-like dynamic models typically assume the single-option col-
lusion proposal, i.e., an offer of a bribe, from the bidder with the move to the
opponent, in exchange for the latter’s cooperation. For example, apart from the pa-
pers mentioned in the introduction, Chen and Tauman (2006) address the potential
collusion problem of the opponent cheating by using shill bidders in second price
auctions. Kivetz and Tauman (2010) consider a complete information model of a
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first price auction. Balzer (2019) considers a more general set of mechanisms for
first price and second price auctions. The main difference is that we consider a
simple and natural double-option proposal in a second price auction and focus on
its implementability and profitability for the initiator while his main objective is to
examine the difference between a first price and a second price auction in terms of
the possibility of efficient collusion.
More broadly, our paper is related to the strand of mechanism-design literature
that studies the informed-principal problem, due to the seminal works of Myerson
(1983), Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Maskin and Tirole (1992). In particular,
Maskin and Tirole (1990) consider a private value setting in which the principal
proposes a contract that itself is a game to be played when it is accepted by the
agent and the whole game ends if it is rejected. They show that the principal
is generally better off as compared to the scenario when his type is of complete
information.
Our paper is also related to the literature of multidimensional signaling games
pioneered by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Wilson (1985). In particular, Mil-
grom and Roberts (1986) study the problem of a firm that can use both price and
advertising expenditure to signal its product quality to consumers. In their model,
the firm has only two types and the advertising expenditure is dissipative. In con-
trast, in our model the initiator has a continuum of types and neither of the signals
is dissipative.
2 The model
Two risk-neutral bidders are about to attend a second price auction in which there
is a single indivisible object and no reserve price.3 Before the auction starts, bidder
1 (he) has an opportunity to make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to bidder 2 (she).
The proposal consists of a nonnegative bribe and a nonnegative request, denoted
by (b,r) with b,r≥ 0. If bidder 2 accepts the bribe, then bidder 1 pays b to her and
she bids zero in the auction so that bidder 1 wins the object at a price of zero. If
bidder 2 accepts the request, then she pays r to bidder 1 who then bids zero in the
auction and she wins the object at a price of zero. If bidder 2 rejects the proposal,
then both bidders bid non-cooperatively in the auction.
We assume bidders’ valuation (or type) distributions are independent, but allow
for asymmetry. For i = 1,2, bidder i’s valuation vi is independently distributed
3A discussion of a reserve price is given in section 5.1.
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according to Fi(vi) on [vi, v¯i]. Each distribution function Fi admits a continuous
density function fi(vi) ∈ (0,∞) for all vi. We assume vi ≥ 0 and v¯i < ∞.
We focus on pure strategy separating equilibria. So both bidders use pure
strategies whenever they are supposed to take the move. We assume that if bidder
2 rejects the proposal then both bidders bid truthfully in the second-price auction
since it is a weakly dominant strategy.
We let b(v1) and r(v1) be the bribing and requesting functions in an equilib-
rium. One immediate observation of our model is that if v1 ≥ v¯2, then there al-
ways exists a separating equilibrium in which b(v1) = 0 and r(v1) = v1. In the
equilibrium, all types of bidder 2 accepts the zero bribe and bidder 1 realizes his
valuation.4 Hence, below we focus on the non-trivial case of v1 < v¯2.
3 A separating equilibrium
Suppose there exists a separating equilibrium in which bidder 1’s request is not
greater than his own valuation. We assume that bidder 2 is willing to accept a
proposal if she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it.5 In the equi-
librium, upon receiving a separating proposal (b,r) from type v1, for bidder 2,
accepting b gives a payoff of b, accepting r gives a payoff of v2− r and reject-
ing the proposal gives a payoff of v2− v1. Thus, if r ≤ v1, it is optimal for bid-
der 2 to accept b if v2 ≤ b+ r and accept r if v2 > b+ r.6 The expected pay-
off of bidder 1 with valuation v1 from a separating proposal (b,r) with r ≤ v1 is
pi(v1,b,r) = F2(b+ r)(v1−b)+(1−F2(b+ r))r, which can be rewritten as
pi(v1,b,r) = F2(b+ r)(v1− (b+ r))+ r.
For convenience of exposition, let v1 be the smallest value such that, if it exists,
b(v1)+ v1 = v¯2, (1)
and thus F2(b(v1)+ v1) = 1. To save notation, we let pi(v1)≡ pi(v1,b(v1),r(v1)).
The following proposition shows that for any distribution F1 and F2, there al-
ways exists a separating equilibrium in which bidder 1 requests his own valuation.
4The single-option model in ES shares the same equilibrium in this case, i.e., b(v1) = 0 for all v.
5Accepting the proposal in this case is a best response (i.e., there is no profitable deviation).
6Although type v2 = b+ r is indifferent between accepting b and accepting r, for simplicity we
assume she accepts b when she accepts the proposal.
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Proposition 1. There exists a separating equilibrium in which
• for any type v1 ≤ v1, b(v1) is given by
b′(v1) =
1
f2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1)+F2(b(v1)+ v1)
−1, (2)
with an initial condition b(v1) = 0, which always admits a unique solution.
For any type v1 > v1, b(v1) = b(v1).7
• for any type v1, r(v1) = v1.8
Bidder 2 always accepts the equilibrium proposal (b(v1),v1), i.e., accepts b(v1) if
v2 ≤ b(v1)+ v1 and accepts the request v1 if v2 > b(v1)+ v1.
Proof. For any type v1 < v1, the on-path incentive compatibility (IC) condition for
an equilibrium in which r(v1)≤ v1 is
v1 ∈ argmax
t
pi(v1,b(t),r(t)) = F2(b(t)+ r(t))(v1− (b(t)+ r(t)))+ r(t). (3)
which implies
[ f2(b(v1)+r(v1))(v1−(b(v1)+r(v1)))−F2(b(v1)+r(v1))](b′(v1)+r′(v1))+r′(v1)= 0.
(4)
In the equilibrium with r(v1) = v1, the bribing function b(v1) satisfies
[ f2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1)+F2(b(v1)+ v1)](b′(v1)+1) = 1,
which in turn can be rewritten as (2).
With the initial condition b(v1) = 0, which implies b
′(v1) > 0, the differential
equation in (2) always has a unique solution. It also follows that b′(v1) > 0. Fur-
thermore, whenever b(v1) = 0 for some v1, b′(v1) > 0. Thus b(v1) ≥ 0 for any v1
and is an admissible bribing function.
Observe that (2) implies b(v1)+ v1 is strictly increasing for all v1 and thus the
equilibrium is separating. So F2(b(v1)+ v1) = 1 for all v1 ≥ v1. It follows that
7By (2), b′(v1) = 0 for all v1 > v1.
8Technically, for any type v1 > v1, r(v1) can be any value such that b(v1)+ r(v1)≥ v¯2 and r(v1)
takes different values for different v1. Alternatively, in an equilibrium, for any type v1 > v1, r(v1) can
be equal to v1 so that there is a pooling segment on the top. However, the equilibria are essentially
equivalent.
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for any type v1 > v1, b(v1) = b(v1), since for these types the equilibrium propos-
als must be such that b(v1) are always accepted by all types of bidder 2 and the
equilibrium payoff of such types is v1−b(v1).
We now show that there is no profitable on-path deviation for any type v1, i.e.,
given that all other types of bidder 1 are following the equilibrium proposals, it is
not profitable for type v1 to send any on-path proposal (b(t), t), t 6= v1. Consider
the expected payoff of type v1 from deviating to (b(t), t), i.e., pi(v1,b(t), t). While
pi ′v1(v1,b(t), t) = F(b(t) + t) for any given t, the envelope theorem implies that
pi ′(v1) = F(b(v1)+v1). Because b(v1)+v1 is strictly increasing, it implies that for
any given t, pi ′(v1)−pi ′v1(v1,b(t), t)≷ 0 for any v1 ≷ t. Hence pi(v1)> pi(v1,b(t), t)
for any v1 6= t.
There are two types of off-path deviations in the equilibrium. First, there are
many unsent off-path proposals by bidder 1. Second, because in the equilibrium,
given an on-path proposal, bidder 2 on the path is supposed to accept the proposal
with probability one, rejection becomes an off-path deviation as well. However, for
the latter type of off-path deviations, it is straightforward to see that for any belief of
bidder 1 it is not profitable for any type of bidder 2 to reject the received equilibrium
proposal, since it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder 1 to submit a bid of his
valuation in the auction. So the only non-trivial type of off-path deviations is the
former, which is two dimensional and thus of a large set.
Below, we show that there exists a system of off-path beliefs of bidder 2 such
that given the resulting best-response of bidder 2, it is not profitable for bidder 1 to
deviate to any off-path proposals. In particular, the off-path beliefs of bidder 2 are
reasonable in the sense of the D1 criterion.
Cho and Sobel’s D1 criterion says that if, upon observing an off-path action,
any best responses of the receiver (based on some beliefs about the sender’s type)
that imply a profitable deviation for a sender type imply also a profitable devia-
tion for another sender type and the converse is not true, then, upon observing that
off-path action the receiver’s posterior beliefs should place zero probability on the
former type. Roughly speaking in an alternative way, if a type of the sender is dom-
inated by another type in terms of the expected payoff of the sender for possible
best responses of the receiver, then the former type should be excluded from the set
of reasonable beliefs of the receiver. Hence, if for an off-path action there exists
some type of the sender that is not dominated by any other types, then a reasonable
belief of the receiver is that it is the sender’s type. If for each off-path action, there
8
exists such a reasonable belief that the best response of the receiver based on the
belief implies that it is not profitable for any type of the sender to deviate to the
off-path action, then the equilibrium survives the D1 criterion.
We first describe the set of best responses of bidder 2 upon receiving an off-path
proposal (b,r).
Lemma 1. Upon receiving an off-path proposal (b,r), the best response of bidder
2 can be described as a pair of critical values (vb2,v
r
2) such that she accepts b if
v2 ≤ vb2, rejects the proposal if vb2 < v2 < vr2 and accepts r if v2 ≥ vr2. In particular,
vb2 ≤min{b+ r, v¯2} ≤ vr2 ≤ v¯2. (5)
Proof. Observe that bidder 2 never accepts r if her type v2≤ b+r and never accepts
b otherwise. That is, for any type v2 ≤ b+ r, her best response is either to accept
b or reject the proposal (thus compete with bidder 1 in the auction). Similarly, for
any type v2 > b+ r, her best response is either to accept r or reject the proposal.
As shown in ES, when bidder 2’s decision making problem is to determine
whether to accept or reject a bribe b (and thus compete non-cooperatively with
bidder 1 in the auction), the decision rule requires that for any type v2 and vb2, if
type vb2 accepts b, then any type v2 < v
b
2 accepts b.
We show below that when bidder 2’s decision making problem is to determine
whether to accept or reject a request r (and thus compete non-cooperatively with
bidder 1 in the auction), the decision rule requires that for any type v2 and v′2, if
type v′2 accepts r, then any type v2 > v
′
2 accepts r.
First we suppose b+ r < v¯2. Let the set of types of bidder 1 sending proposal
(b,r) be Qb,r. Suppose v2,v′2 ≥ b+ r and v2 > v′2. For bidder 2 with type v2,
the difference between the expected payoffs from accepting r and rejecting the
proposal is ∆v2 ≡ v2− r−E[(v2− v1)1v1<v2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r], where 1X is the indicator
function for event X . Thus,
∆v2−∆v′2 = v2− v′2− (E[(v2− v1)1v1<v2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r]−E[(v′2− v1)1v1<v′2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r])
≥ v2− v′2− (E[(v2− v1)1v1<v2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r]−E[(v′2− v1)1v1<v2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r])
= v2− v′2−E[(v2− v′2)1v1<v2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r]
= (v2− v′2)(1−E[1v1<v2 |v1 ∈ Qb,r])
≥ 0.
Therefore, there exists a vr2 ≥ b+ r such that any type v2 ≥ vr2 accepts r and any
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type v2 ∈ (b+ r,vr2) rejects the proposal.
If also follows from above that if b+ r≥ v¯2, then the statement in the lemma is
automatically true. This completes the proof.
For convenience, we record the following fact which follows directly from the
envelope theorem and (2).
Fact 1. pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+ v1), pi(v1) = v1−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1) and b(v1)+ v1
is strictly increasing.
For an off-path proposal (b,r), given a best response (vb2,v
r
2) of bidder 2 as
described in Lemma 1, the expected payoff of type v1, denoted by pi(v1,b,r,vb2,v
r
2),
is given by
pi(v1,b,r,vb2,v
r
2)≡ F2(vb2)(v1−b)+
∫ min{vr2,v1}
min{vb2,v1}
(v1− v2) f2(v2)dv2+(1−F2(vr2))r.
(6)
The derivative of pi(v1,b,r,vb2,v
r
2) w.r.t. v1 is
pi ′v1(v1,b,r,v
b
2,v
r
2) =

F2(vb2) if v1 ≤ vb2,
F2(v1) if v1 ∈ (vb2,vr2],
F2(vr2) if v1 > v
r
2.
(7)
Recall that pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+ v1). Because b(v1) > 0 for any type v1 > v1, (7)
implies that given any vb2 and v
r
2, pi ′v1(v1,b,r,v
b
2,v
r
2) < pi ′(v1) for any type v1 ≥ vb2.
Thus we have the following fact.
Fact 2. For an off-path proposal (b,r) and a best response (vb2,v
r
2) of bidder 2, if
pi(vb2,b,r,v
b
2,v
r
2)≤ pi(vb2), then for any type v1 > vb2, pi(v1,b,r,vb2,vr2)< pi(v1).
The next two facts identify some off-path proposals that would never be made
by any type of bidder 1.
Fact 3. Consider an off-path proposal (b,r). If r ≤ v1, then it is not profitable for
any type v1 to deviate to (b,r) for any belief of bidder 2.
Proof of Fact 3: Recall that when bidder 2 receives a proposal (b,r), accepting r
gives a payoff v2− r while rejecting the proposal gives a payoff v2− v1. Thus, if
r ≤ v1, then the proposal is never rejected.
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Suppose b+ r < v¯2. Then for type v2 < b+ r, it is more profitable to accept b
than r. Hence, if r ≤ v1, bidder 2’s best response is to accept b if v2 ≤ b+ r and
accept r if v2 > b+ r, i.e., vb2 = b+ r = v
r
2. So the expected payoff of type v1 is
pi(v1,b,r,b+ r,b+ r) = F2(b+ r)(v1− (b+ r))+ r. Then
pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r,b+ r,b+ r) = v1−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1)− [F2(b+ r)(v1− (b+ r))+ r]
= (1−F2(b+ r))(v1− r)+F2(b+ r)b−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1).
If b(v1) < b and b(v1) + v1 < b+ r, then obviously pi(v1)− pi(v1,b,r,b+ r,b+
r) > 0. Because r ≤ v1, if b(v1) < b and b(v1)+ v1 ≥ b+ r, or b(v1) ≥ b, then
pi ′v1(v1,b,r,b+ r,b+ r) = F2(b+ r) ≤ F2(b(v1)+ v1) = pi ′(v1). Since r ≤ v1, we
have that
pi(v1,b,r,b+ r,b+ r) = F2(b+ r)(v1−b)+(1−F2(b+ r))r
≤ F2(b+ r)v1+(1−F2(b+ r))r
≤ v1 = pi(v1).
Hence, pi(v1)≥ pi(v1,b,r,b+ r,b+ r) for any v1 if r ≤ v1.
Suppose b+ r ≥ v¯2. Then vb2 = vr2 = v¯2. Then pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) = v1−b. So
pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) = b−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1)
If b≥ b(v1), then obviously pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2)≥ 0. If b < b(v1), then since
r ≤ v1, we have b(v1)+ v1 ≥ b+ r ≥ v¯2, which implies pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+ v1) =
1 = pi ′v1(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2). Again, since pi(v1) ≥ pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2), we have pi(v1) ≥
pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) for any v1.
Intuitively, since bidder 1’s value for bidder 2 is at least v1, bidder 1 does not
have an incentive to request an amount lower than v1. Fact 3 implies we can restrict
attention to proposals with r > v1.
The following fact further excludes proposals (b,r)with r > v1 and b≥ v¯2−v1.
Fact 4. Consider an off-path proposal (b,r). If r > v1 and b ≥ v¯2− v1, then it is
not profitable for any type v1 to deviate to (b,r) for any belief of bidder 2.
Proof of Fact 4: If r > v1 and b ≥ v¯2− v1, then the bribe is accepted by all types
of bidder 2, since b ≥ v2− v1 implies that for any type v2, accepting b is more
profitable than competing with bidder 1 in the auction and b ≥ v¯2− v1 > v2− r
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implies accepting b is more profitable than accepting r, i.e., the best response of
bidder 2 is described by vb2 = v¯2 = v
r
2. So the expected payoff of bidder 1 with
type v1 is pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) = v1− b. If v¯1 < v¯2, then pi(v¯1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) = v¯1− b <
v¯2− b ≤ v1 = pi(v1). Since pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) is non-decreasing in v1 and pi(v1) is
strictly increasing, pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) < pi(v1) for any type v1 ∈ [v1, v¯1]. If v¯1 ≥ v¯2,
then for v1 = v¯2, pi(v¯2,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) = v¯2− b ≤ v1 = pi(v1). By the monotonicity of
pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2) and pi(v1), we have pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2)≤ pi(v1) for any type v1 ≤ v¯2.
Then by Fact 2, pi(v1,b,r, v¯2, v¯2)≤ pi(v1) for any type v1 ∈ [v1, v¯1].
Fact 3 and Fact 4 together imply we can restrict attention to proposals with
r > v1 and b < v¯2− v1.
Fact 5. Consider an off-path proposal (b,r) with r > v1 and b < v¯2− v1. If b > 0
or v1 > 0, then pi(v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2)< pi(v1) for any type v1.
Proof of Fact 5: From (6),
pi(v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) = F2(b+ v1)(v1−b)+
∫ v1
min{b+v1,v1}
(v1− v2) f2(v2)dv2
If b > 0, then b+ v1 > v1. Since pi(v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) is non-decreasing and
pi(v1) is strictly increasing, if v¯1 ≤ b+ v1, then pi(v¯1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) = F2(b+
v1)(v¯1− b) ≤ v1 = pi(v1) which in turn implies that pi(v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) < pi(v1)
for any type v1 ∈ [v1, v¯1]. If v¯1 > b+ v1, then pi(b+ v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) = F2(b+
v1)v1≤ v1 = pi(v1). By the monotonicity of pi(v1,b,r,b+v1, v¯2) and pi(v1), we have
pi(v1,b,r,b+v1, v¯2)< pi(v1) for any type v1 ≤ b+v1. Then by Fact 2, pi(v1,b,r,b+
v1, v¯2)< pi(v1) for any type v1 ∈ [v1, v¯1].
If b = 0 and v1 > 0, then pi(b+ v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) = F2(v1)v1 < v1 = pi(v1)
since we assume v1 < v¯2. By the similar arguments in the case of b > 0, we also
have pi(v1,b,r,b+ v1, v¯2) < pi(v1) for any type v1 ∈ [v1, v¯1]. This completes the
proof.
We are now ready to show that the equilibrium identified above survives the
D1 criterion.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium identified above survives the D1 criterion.
Proof. By Fact 3 and Fact 4, we can focus on off-path proposals (b,r) with r > v1
and b < v¯2− v1. So b+ v1 < b+ r and b+ v1 < v¯2. For convenience of exposition,
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below we consider only the case b+ r ≤ v¯2. The analysis of the case of b+ r > v¯2
is identical and omitted.9
The lowest belief of bidder 2 is v1 = v1. If bidder 2 believes v1 = v1, accepting
b gives b, rejecting the proposal gives v2− v1. So any type v2 ≤ b+ v1 < b+ r
always accepts b, i.e., vb2 ≥ b+ v1. Hence, below we can focus on the beliefs such
that vb2 ∈ [b+ v1,b+ r] and vr2 ∈ [b+ r, v¯2].10
Suppose b = 0 and v1 = 0. When v
b
2 = v1 = 0, and v
r
2 = v¯2, i.e., the proposal is
rejected by all types of bidder 2 and both bidders compete in the auction, only type
v1 is indifferent between the equilibrium payoff and the payoff from the deviation
while all other types of bidder 1 are strictly worse off. To see this, the expected
payoff from the deviation is the one from a standard second price auction, which
has a slope F2(v1), which in turn is strictly smaller than pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+ v1).
Hence, type v1 = 0 can not be excluded by the D1 criterion and a reasonable
belief of bidder 2 is that bidder 1’s type is v1 = v1 = 0. Since b = 0, the best
response of bidder 2 with this belief is then to reject the proposal and compete with
bidder 1 in the auction. Then the above confirms it is not profitable for any type
of bidder 1 to deviate to the off-path (b = 0,r). Hence, below we only need to
examine the event b > 0 or v1 > 0.
For a given pair of (b,r), let
M(vb2,v
r
2) = maxv1
pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r,vb2,vr2). (8)
Clearly for any given vb2 ∈ [b+v1,b+r] and vr2 ∈ [b+r, v¯2], pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r,vb2,vr2)
is well defined on [v1, v¯1] and continuous in v1. By the extreme value theorem, it
admits a maximum for any vb2,v
r
2 in the relevant intervals. The solution to maxi-
mization problem in (8) is continuous and thus M(vb2,v
r
2) is continuous.
Suppose for a given proposal (b,r), there exists no vb2 ∈ [b+ v1,b+ r] and no
vr2 ∈ [b+ r, v¯2] such that M(vb2,vr2)> 0. Then pi(v1,b,r,vb2,vr2)≤ pi(v1) for any type
v1, i.e., it is not profitable for any type of bidder 1 to deviate to (b,r) for any belief
of bidder 2 and we are done.
Suppose for a given proposal (b,r), for some vb2 = v
b′
2 ∈ [b+ v1,b+ r] and
vr2 = v
r′
2 ∈ [b+ r, v¯2], M(vb
′
2 ,v
r′
2 )> 0. Observe that Fact 5 implies M(b+v1, v¯2)< 0.
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists some vb2 = v
b∗
2 ∈ [b+ v1,vb
′
2 ] and
9See footnote 10.
10When b+ r > v¯2, only the bribe will be considered by bidder 2 seriously. Thus, in this case,
vb2 ∈ [b+ v1, v¯2] and vr2 = v¯2. So the analysis for this case is the direct translation from the current
one below, i.e., replacing b+ r and vr2 by v¯2.
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vr2 = v
r∗
2 ∈ [vr
′
2 , v¯2] such that M(v
b∗
2 ,v
r∗
2 ) = 0. Let V1 be the set of v1 such that
M(vb∗2 ,v
r∗
2 ) = 0. Then by the fact pi ′(v1)− pi ′v1(v1,b,r,vb2,vr2) > 0 for all v1 ≥ vb2
(from (7) and Fact 1), we can conclude that for any v1 = v∗ ∈ V1,
v∗ < vb∗2 ≤ b+ r. (9)
By the fact that pi ′v1(v1,b,r,v
b
2,v
r
2) = v
b
2 for all v1 ≤ vb2 and pi(v1) is strictly convex
(again from (7) and Fact 1), V1 is a singleton.
Thus, if for some type v1, there exists some vb2 ∈ [b+v1,b+r] and vr2 ∈ [b+r, v¯2]
such that pi(v1,b,r,vb2,v
r
2)≥ pi(v1), then there must exist a pair of (vb∗2 ,vr∗2 ) such that
pi(v1,b,r,vb∗2 ,v
r∗
2 ) is tangent to pi(v1) at some unique v1 = v∗, in the sense that for
all v1 6= v∗, pi(v1,b,r,vb∗2 ,vr∗2 )< pi(v1) and pi(v∗,b,r,vb∗2 ,vr∗2 ) = pi(v∗). Hence, type
v∗ is not excluded by the D1 criterion. So a reasonable belief of bidder 2 is that
bidder 1’s type is v1 = v∗ and we adopt this belief for the analysis below.
Suppose the tangency point is at v1 and thus a reasonable belief of bidder 2
is v1 = v1. Then for bidder 2, accepting b gives b, accepting r gives v2− r and
rejecting the proposal gives v2− v1. Since r > v1 and b < v¯2− v1, it is optimal for
bidder 2 to accept b if v2 ≤ b+ v1 and reject the proposal otherwise. Then Fact 5
implies it is not profitable for any type of bidder 1 to deviate to the proposal.
It follows then that below we can focus on interior tangency points, i.e, v∗ ∈
(v1,v
b∗
2 ). It in turn follows that pi
′
v1(v∗,b,r,v
b
2,v
r
2) = pi ′(v∗), which implies vb∗2 =
b(v∗)+ v∗.
Suppose vb∗2 = b+ r = v
r∗
2 , which implies b(v∗)+ v∗ = b+ r. If v∗ ≥ r, then
the best response of bidder 2 is to accept b if v2 ≤ b+ r and accept r otherwise.
Then the expected payoff of any type v1 from the best response is then exactly
pi(v1,b,r,vb∗2 ,v
r∗
2 ), which, by tangency, is no greater than pi(v1) and we are done.
The sub-case v∗ < r is analyzed below together with the case of vb∗2 < b+ r or
b+ r < vr∗2 .
Suppose vb∗2 < b+ r or b+ r < v
r∗
2 . Then we can always conclude v∗ < r. To
see this, observe that type v∗ is indifferent between pi(v∗,b,r,vb∗2 ,v
r∗
2 ) and pi(v∗),
i.e.,
F2(vb∗2 )(v∗−b)+(1−F2(vr∗2 ))r = v∗−F2(b(v∗)+ v∗)b(v∗),
which, by the fact that vb∗2 = b(v∗)+ v∗, can be rearranged into
v∗− r = F2(vb∗2 )(b(v∗)+ v∗−b)−F2(vr∗2 )r.
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Thus, if vb∗2 < b+ r or if b+ r < v
r∗
2 , then v
b∗
2 < v
r∗
2 and v
b∗
2 = b(v∗)+ v∗ ≤ b+ r,
which in turn implies v∗ < r.
So below we can focus on the belief v1 = v∗ < r, with which the best response
of bidder 2 is to accept b if v2 ≤ b+ v∗ and reject the proposal otherwise. And the
expected payoff of bidder 1 from the proposal is then pi(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2).
By Fact 2, we can for now restrict our attention to type v1 ≤ b+ v∗. For any
type v1 ≤ b+ v∗, the expected payoff is
pi(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2) = F2(b+ v∗)(v1−b).
The tangency condition says, for any type v1,
pi(v1,b,r,vb∗2 ,v
r∗
2 ) = F2(b(v∗)+ v∗)(v1−b)+(1−F2(vr∗2 ))r
≤ v1−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1)
= pi(v1).
Suppose b ≤ b(v∗). Then clearly pi(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2) ≤ pi(v1,b,r,vb∗2 ,vr∗2 ) ≤
pi(v1) for any type v1.
Suppose b > b(v∗). Then
pi(v∗)−pi(v∗,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2) = v∗−F2(b(v∗)+ v∗)−F2(b+ v∗)(v∗−b)
= v∗(1−F2(b+ v∗))+F2(b+ v∗)b−F2(b(v∗)+ v∗)b(v∗)
≥ 0.
Furthermore, recall that pi(v1) is strictly convex and observe that pi(v∗,b,r,b+
v∗, v¯2) has a constant slope for v1 < v∗. So b+v∗> b(v∗)+v∗ implies pi ′v1(v1,b,r,b+
v∗, v¯2) = F2(b+v∗)> F2(b(v1)+v1) = pi ′(v1) for any type v1 < v∗. So for any type
v1 < v∗, pi(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2)< pi(v1). For any type v1 ∈ (v∗,b+ v∗],
pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r,b+v∗, v¯2)= v1(1−F2(b+v∗))+F2(b+v∗)b−F2(b(v1)+v1)b(v1).
If b(v1)< b and b(v1)+v1 < b+v∗, then obviously pi(v1)−pi(v1,b,r,b+v∗, v¯2)>
0. If b(v1) < b and b(v1)+ v1 ≥ b+ v∗, or if b(v1) ≥ b, then pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+
v1)> F2(b+ v∗) = pi ′v1(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2) for any type v1 ∈ (v∗,b+ v∗]. Since from
above, pi(v∗)> pi(v∗,b,r,b+v∗, v¯2), we have that for any v1 ∈ (v∗,b+v∗], pi(v1)>
pi(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2). Fact 2 then implies pi(v1)> pi(v1,b,r,b+ v∗, v¯2) for any v1 ∈
[v1, v¯1].
15
Aggregating all above cases, the proof of the equilibrium surviving the D1
criterion is completed.
The following example sheds some light on the equilibrium.
Example 1. Suppose F2(x) = x on [0,1]. Suppose v1 is distributed on [0,1]. Then
for all v1 satisfying b(v1)+ v1 ≤ 1, (2) becomes
b′(v1) =
1
2b(v1)+ v1
−1.
The solution is
b(v1) =
1
2
(
2W
(
−e− v12 −1
)
− v1+2
)
,
where W (x) solves
x =W (x)eW (x).
With the initial condition b(0) = 0, the equilibrium bribing function b(v1) is
plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The equilibrium bribing and requesting functions when F2(x) = x and
v1 = 0.
The example above illustrates two interesting features of the equilibrium brib-
ing function.
First, the bribing function can be non-monotone for high types. In our game,
both the bribe and the request are costly signals. Intuitively, for low types of bidder
1, both the bribes and the requests are low, so that with high probability the requests
are accepted. Hence, for a low type of bidder 1 to separate himself from even lower
types, it is necessary to raise the bribe high enough so that it is costly enough for
even lower types to have no incentive to mimic him. On the other hand, for high
types, the probability of the requests being accepted is low and thus the signals
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from the requests themselves are very costly and it is unnecessary to offer a too
high bribe. In the uniform case, it is even feasible to lower the bribe for high
enough types.
Second, unlike in the single-option model of ES, here for some low types of
bidder 1, the bribe may exceed his valuation. Since b′(v1) = 1/F2(v1)− 1, this is
possible if F2(v1) <
1
2 . The fact that the equilibrium bribe may exceed bidder 1’s
valuation suggests that it can be very costly for some types of bidder 1 to signal
his strength. In contrast, in ES’s single-option model, the separating bribes do not
exceed bidder 1’s valuation.11 It is interesting to investigate whether it is more
profitable for bidder 1 to implement the double-option scheme.
4 The expected payoff of the initiator
In this section we first compare the expected payoff of bidder 1 in the identified
robust equilibrium in our model to the counterpart in ES.
In ES, bidder 1 commits to offering a variable take-it-or-leave-it bribe to bidder
2. For separating bribes, let the bribing function be Bes(v1) in their model. Then
the incentive compatibility condition for type v1 with a separating bribe is
v1 ∈ argmax
t
Π(v1, t) = F(Bes(t)+ t)(v1−Bes(t))+
∫ v1
min{Bes(t)+t,v1}
(v1− x) f2(x)dx,
which implies
B′es(v1) =
f2(v1+Bes(v1))(v1−Bes(v1))
F2(v1+Bes(v1))− f2(v1+Bes(v1))(v1−Bes(v1)) . (10)
Under some regularity conditions, ES identify the set of equilibria that survive the
D1 criterion. In such an equilibrium, for some vˆ1, the bribing function, denoted by
B(·), is
B(v1) =
Bes(v1) if v1 < vˆ,Bˆ≡ vˆ1−F2(vˆ1+Bes(vˆ1))(vˆ1−Bes(vˆ1)) otherwise. (11)
where Bˆ≥ v¯2−E[v1|v1 ≥ vˆ]. The expected payoff function of bidder 1, denoted by
11In the robust equilibria in ES, there may exist a pooling bribe which for some types of bidder 1
may exceed the valuations. But in that case, the bribe is accepted by all types of bidder 2 and thus
bidder 1 benefits from the acceptance of high types of bidder 2.
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Π(·), in such an equilibrium is
Π(v1) =
F2(v1+B(v1))(v1−B(v1)) if v1 ≤ vˆ,v1− Bˆ otherwise. (12)
Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a robust equilibrium in ES. Then pi(v1) ≥
Π(v1) for any v1.
Proof. In our model the expected payoff of bidder 1 is pi(v1) = v1−F2(b(v1)+
v1)b(v1) and pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+ v1). In a robust equilibrium with a bribing func-
tion B(v1) in ES, the expected payoff of bidder 1 is Π(v1) = F(B(v1)+ v1)(v1−
B(v1)) and the envelope theorem implies Π′(v1) = F(B(v1)+ v1) for type v1 ≤ vˆ1,
which is also true for type v1 > vˆ1 in fact. Thus
pi(v1)−Π(v1)= v1(1−F2(B(v1)+v1))+F2(B(v1)+v1)B(v1)−F2(b(v1)+v1)b(v1).
So, whenever B(v1) ≥ b(v1), pi(v1)−Π(v1) ≥ 0. On the other hand, whenever
B(v1)< b(v1), pi ′(v1)>Π′(v1). Since pi(v1) = v1 ≥Π(v1), pi(v1)≥Π(v1) for any
type v1.
So far, we have focused on the separating equilibrium in which bidder 1’s re-
quest is his valuation. Clearly any pair of (b(v1),r(v1)) satisfying the incentive
compatibility condition in (4), with r(v1) ≤ v1, can sustain a separating equilib-
rium if (b(v1),r(v1)) is separating. Moreover, there may also exist some equilibria
in which for some type v1, r(v1)> v1 so that the request is never accepted. A natu-
ral question is whether the expected payoff of bidder 1 can be improved in some of
those separating equilibria against the equilibrium identified above. We show be-
low that in term of bidder 1’s expected payoff, any separating equilibrium in which
r(v1) 6= v1 is dominated by the one identified above with r(v1) = v1.
Proposition 4. Suppose in our model there exists a different separating equilib-
rium with a pair of bribing and requesting functions (β (v1),γ(v1)). Let the ex-
pected payoff of bidder 1 in the different equilibrium be pi(v1;β ,γ). Then pi(v1)≥
pi(v1;β ,γ).
Proof. Suppose first that γ(v1)≤ v1 for any type v1. Clearly, pi(v1;β ,γ)=F2(β (v1)+
γ(v1))(v1−(β (v1)+γ(v1)))+γ(v1). The envelope theorem implies that pi ′(v1;β ,γ)=
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F2(β (v1)+ γ(v1)). Thus,
pi(v1)−pi(v1;β ,γ) = v1−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1)
− [F2(β (v1)+ γ(v1))(v1− (β (v1)+ γ(v1)))+ γ(v1)]
= (v1− γ(v1))(1−F2(β (v1)+ γ(v1)))
+F2(β (v1)+ γ(v1))β (v1)−F2(b(v1)+ v1)b(v1).
If b(v1)< β (v1) and b(v1)+v1 < β (v1)+γ(v1), then obviously pi(v1)−pi(v1;β ,γ)>
0. If b(v1) < β (v1) and b(v1) + v1 ≥ β (v1) + γ(v1), or if b(v1) ≥ β (v1), then
pi ′(v1) = F2(b(v1)+ v1) ≥ F2(β (v1)+ γ(v1)) = pi ′(v1;β ,γ). Since pi(v1) = v1 ≥
pi(v1;β ,γ), pi(v1)≥ pi(v1;β ,γ) for any type v1.
Suppose now that γ(v1) > v1 for some type v1. For any such a type v1, the
request is never accepted and the bribing function β (v1) must satisfy the incentive
compatibility condition in ES’s model. Consequently, the expected payoff of any
such type v1 must be no greater than the one in the equilibrium with r(v1) = v1.
This completes the proof.
5 Discussions
5.1 Reserve price
We note that the previous results remain essentially unchanged even if there is a
reserve price in the auction. Specifically, given a positive reserve price, there exists
a robust separating equilibrium in which conditional on the object being sold, i.e.,
at least one of the bidders’ valuations exceeds the reserve price, the the collusion
success probability is one. The intuition is the following. Let the reserve price
be R. Observe that any type of bidder 1 below R has no value for bidder 2. In
the separating equilibrium similar to the above, these types are correctly identified
as below R. So for any type v1 ≤ R, the equilibrium bribe b(v1) = 0, which is
never accepted by any v2 > R, and any request r(v1) > 0 (= 0) will be rejected
(accepted) by any type of bidder 2. On the other hand, for any type v1 > R, the
equilibrium request is r(v1) = v1−R, i.e., the valuable part for bidder 2 since if
bidder 2 accept the request, she still needs to payR to the auctioneer.
More formally, when a proposal (b,r) from type v1 is separating and r ≤ v1−
R, then bidder 2 accepts b if v2 ≤ b+r+R and accepts r if v2 > b+r+R. So the
expected payoff of bidder 1 with type v1 is pi(v1) = F2(b+ r+R)(v1−b−R)+
19
(1−F(b+ r+R))r, which can be rewritten as
pi(v1) = F2(b+ r+R)(v1− (b+ r+R))+ r.
The IC condition for the separating equilibrium with r(v1)≤ v1−R becomes
[ f2(b(v1)+ r(v1)+R)(v1− (b(v1)+ r(v1)+R))
−F2(b(v1)+ r(v1)+R)](b′(v1)+ r′(v1))+ r′(v1) = 0.
In the equilibrium with r(v1) = v1−R, it is the same as (2). The only difference
is that the initial condition is changed into b(v1) = 0 and r(v1) = 0 for all v1 ≤R.
Hence, the equilibrium proposal of any type of bidder 1 is always accepted by
bidder 2 (although a zero request has no value for her if her valuation is not higher
than the reserve price).
5.2 First price auction
We observe that with the double-option scheme the initiator may also be able to
secure a successful collusion even if the auction format is changed to a first-price
auction. Rachmilevitch (2013) considers the same single-option scheme as in Eso¨
and Schummer (2004) but with first price auctions. The important result from his
model is that existence of a separating equilibrium is generally impossible and there
may even be no pooling equilibrium. In his model, an important feature of the (pure
strategy) equilibrium of the continuation games is that when a proposal reveals the
initiator’s type perfectly and is rejected, the initiator bids his valuation, v1, and
the rejectors submit the “minimally winning” bid if they find winning worthwhile,
i.e., a value of v+1 , which wins with certainty against any v
′
1 ≤ v1 (but pays v1)
and loses against any v′1 > v1. The driving force for his results of nonexistence
of equilibrium is that a high-type initiator has the incentive to cheat the opponent
by mimicking a low type v1 because on the path the bribe b(v1) of the low type
v1 can be rejected and once it is rejected the high type can bid a value marginally
higher than v+1 and win the auction at a low price. We note that a double-option
model for a first price auction shares the same feature of truthful bidding of the
initiator when the auction format is changed to a first price auction. It then implies
that in the double-option model with a first price auction, for any given separating
proposal, the best response of the opponent is the same as the one in the case of
a second price auction. Hence, the expected payoff of the initiator is the same as
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well. Since on the path the proposal is always accepted, the continuation games
are never played and thus become off-path events. Hence, the driving force for
the nonexistence of a separating equilibrium in Rachmilevitch (2013) disappear
in the double-option model. Hence, the same separating weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium as in the case of a second price auction exists. On the other hand,
whether the equilibrium survives any reasonable off-path refinement is beyond the
scope of the current paper.
6 Conclusion
We have examined a collusion model for second price auctions in which a bidder
has the opportunity to propose a combination of an offer and a request of bribes to
the other bidder. The bidders are involved in a multidimensional signaling game.
Even when asymmetry is allowed, we show the collusion initiator with full bar-
gaining power can always secure a successful collusion in such a dynamic environ-
ment, as in the previous literature with a static environment. This result confirms
the vulnerability of second price auctions in dynamic environment and is in sharp
contrast to the previous dynamic models with single-option considered in Eso¨ and
Schummer (2004). Furthermore, we show that the initiator’s payoff from such
a double-option scheme is generally improved against the single-option scheme.
Thus an initiator with full bargaining power has strong incentive to implement
such a scheme.
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